No Faith in Bad Faith by Cohen, Michael
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 41 | Issue 1 Article 7
1-1989
No Faith in Bad Faith
Michael Cohen
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Cohen, No Faith in Bad Faith, 41 Hastings L.J. 201 (1989).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol41/iss1/7
No Faith In Bad Faith
by
MICHAEL COHEN*
Insurance is boring. In our thirty-second-attention-span world, it is
hard to appreciate the benefits and implications of an insurance policy
until we need one. Yet surprisingly, insurance was a hot topic of discus-
sion among Californians in the fall of 1988 and, despite a massive media
campaign financed by the insurance industry, California's voters stun-
ningly won the right to increased regulation of insurance companies by
passing Proposition 103.1 These same voters undoubtedly would be sur-
prised to learn that other, far reaching changes have occurred regarding
the regulation of insurance companies, and that these changes in the law
deprive many Californians of an important check- against unregulated in-
surer misconduct while granting a "royal bonanza" to insurance
carriers.
2
These changes involve judicial reconsideration of California's bad
faith laws as they apply to insurance companies. Under bad faith law, an
insurer that fails to deal with a policyholder fairly or reasonably may be
liable for large damage awards far exceeding the dollar value of a particu-
lar policy 3 In this way, the courts bestowed upon each individual poli-
cyholder a powerful tool against unfair insurance practices.
Since 1958, the California judiciary has recognized the importance
of preventing insurer misconduct by steadily developing this common -
law action of bad faith.4 But three recent judicial decisions, two by the
California Supreme Court 5 and one by the United States Supreme
Court,6 combine to severely limit the scope and applicability of bad faith
actions against insurance companies.
* B.A. 1986, Univ. of Wisconsin; Member, Third Year Class.
1. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 10, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
2. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 313-14, 758 P.2d
58, 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 133 (1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
3. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 579, 510 P.2d 1032, 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 489 (1973).
4. Communale v. Traders Gen. Ins. Co.,.50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
5. Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 473, 764 P.2d 1059, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 682 (1988); Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d
58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
6. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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These decisions effectively bar a substantial portion of the popula-
tion from bringing bad faith actions against insurance companies. Specif-
ically, these cases prevent individuals receiving insurance through
employee benefit plans from bringing bad faith actions against their in-
surers. Instead, these people are restricted to the rather limited remedy
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 7
This Note, after reviewing the development of bad faith actions against
insurance companies, analyzes the reasoning behind these three recent
cases and demonstrates how and why they should be reconsidered.
I. The Development of Bad Faith Law in California
To understand the full impact of the decisions barring individuals
receiving insurance through employee benefit plans from pursuing bad
faith actions it is important to review the development of bad faith law in
California. This section first discusses the purposes behind, and the
evolution of, bad faith actions. The section then briefly outlines the na-
ture of the duty owed, the damages available when an insurer acts in bad
faith, and the development of a private cause of action under California's
statutory law.
A. Evolution of the Duty to Act in Good Faith
In order to understand the development of the law of bad faith as
applied to insurance companies, it is necessary to consider some of the
unique characteristics of an insurance contract. In California, the judici-
ary treats the insurer-insured relationship differently than other contrac-
tual relationships.8 The reasons for this disparate treatment are varied.
Insurance contracts, because of the tremendous inequality of bar-
gaining power between the parties, are considered contracts of adhesion. 9
A consumer has little or no opportunity to bargain over the terms of an
insurance contract and must either accept the terms of the agreement as
established by the insurer or risk economic ruin.' 0
Another distinguishing characteristic of an insurance contract is
that it transcends that of normal contractual relations and is character-
ized as being quasi-public in nature. I As a consequence of this public
duty, the courts look to the reasonable expectations of both the insured
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1145 (1982 & Supp. III 1989).
8. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819, 598 P.2d 452, 456, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 486 (1979) (Insurer-insured relationship is different than other contractual relation-
ships; the insured does not seek commercial advantage, rather she seeks protection from ca-
lamity), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
9. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 273, 419 P.2d 168, 179, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
115 (1966).
10. Note, Good Faith And Fair Dealing In Insurance Contracts, 25 Hastings L.J. 699, 707
(1974) (authored by William H. Gilardy, Jr).
11. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
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and the public at large in evaluating the insurer's performance of its con-
tractual duties.' 2 The insurance carrier thus is held to a higher standard
of conduct "commensurate with the public nature of its business."' 3
Finally, the terms of the insurance contract itself justify deviation
from traditional contract law principles. Under traditional contract law,
damages for breach of contract are limited to those contemplated at the
time the contract is formed. 14 A strict reading of this rule might limit
the damages available in actions against insurers to the amount due
under the policy. In a bad faith action, however, the insured is suing for
damages proximately caused by the insurer's breach, as well as the pro-
ceeds allegedly owed to him. If the insurance carrier's "punishment" for
wrongly refusing to pay a claim, for example, merely is being forced to
pay that which was owed to the insured in the first place, there would be
no incentive for the insurer to act in good faith.' 5
California courts also recognize that extra-contractual damages in
bad faith actions, particularly damages for emotional distress, are a fore-
seeable consequence of an insurer's unwarranted breach of an insurance
contract. This policy stems from the fact that most consumers purchase
insurance to protect themselves from financial loss and the emotional suf-
fering related to such loss. 16 Thus, insurers should know that refusing to
pay a valid claim could result in emotional distress. This recognition
further distinguishes the insurance contract from more typical commer-
cial contracts, and argues against mechanical application of traditional
contract law principles to bad faith breaches.
The substantive law of bad faith in insurance cases reflects careful
judicial consideration of the special nature of the insurer-insured rela-
tionship and an awareness that traditional contract law is inadequate in
this context. In response, the courts of this state developed a common-
law theory that commingles tort law with the principle implying a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract entered into in this
state. '7
In the insurance context, this covenant prohibits either party from
"impairing the right of one party to receive the benefits of the agree-
12. Note, supra note 10, at 708.
13. Id.
14. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
15. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 809, 598 P.2d at 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 482; see also Seaman's
Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1984) (Tort damages of emotional distress available in bad faith actions, as well as punitive
damages, provide the most effective means of deterring insurer misconduct.).
16. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
19 (1967).
17. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 940, 553 P.2d 584, 586, 132 Cal. Rptr.
424, 426 (1976).
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ment." 8 Moreover, because of the special nature of an insurance con-
tract, this duty of good faith places an affirmative duty on the insurer to
act reasonably in dealing with its insureds.' 9
The mix of tort and contract principles governing insurer liability
first arose in the case of Communale v. Traders and General Insurance
Co.20 In Communale, the insurance carrier refused to accept a settle-
ment offer or defend an action on behalf of its insured, who was being
sued for negligence. A verdict was rendered against the insured for an
amount exceeding his policy limits, and he sued his insurance carrier to
recover the portion of the judgment that exceeded the policy coverage.2'
The court held that the insurer failed to consider adequately the
interests of its insured by refusing to defend the action or pursue settle-
ment opportunities. In so doing, the insurer had violated the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
Significantly, the Communale court distinguished an insurance car-
rier's liability for merely breaching a term of the contract from its liabil-
ity for failing to fulfill its obligations under the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 22 Though derived from the parties' contractual rela-
tionship, the duty of good faith and fair dealing goes "deeper than the
mere surface of the contract, '2 3 encompassing liabilities that sound in
tort as well as contract.2 4
The California Supreme Court expressly recognized the tortious na-
ture of a bad faith breach of the duty to accept reasonable settlement
offers in the landmark case Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.2 5 The facts in
Crisci are similar to those of Communale. The plaintiff was an insured
who sued her insurance company for unreasonably refusing to accept a
settlement offer in a suit brought against her for negligence. 26 The court,
relying on Communale, reaffirmed the insurance carrier's duty to accept
reasonable settlement offers in behalf of its insured, even though the ex-
press terms of the insurance policy imposes no such duty.2 7
The court stated that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
obligates an insurer to "give the interests of the insured at least as much
consideration as it give to its own interests. ' 28 The court's test for deter-
18. Id.
19. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818-19, 598 P.2d 452. 456, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 486 (1979).
20. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
21. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
22. Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
23. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200-01.
24. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203.
25. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
26. Id. at 427, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
27. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
28. Id.
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mining whether these interests have been considered properly was
"whether a prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted
the settlement offer." 29
Finally, the Crisci court, consistent with characterizing a breach of
the covenant of good faith as a tort, approved the plaintiff's recovery of
damages for emotional distress. 30 In approving these extra-contractual
damages the court noted that consumers do not purchase insurance "to
obtain commercial advantage," rather they purchase insurance mainly
for "peace of mind and security."13'
In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,32 the California Supreme
Court further extended its special treatment of the insurer-insured rela-
tionship beyond cases of wrongful refusal to settle, and applied the prin-
ciple to an insurer's unreasonable refusal to pay the policy claims of its
insured. The court viewed the duty to accept reasonable settlements and
the duty to handle the claims of its insured in good faith as two different
aspects of the same duty.33 The court stated:
[T]he insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its con-
tractual responsibilities. Where in so doing, [if] it fails to deal fairly
and in good faith with its insured by refusing, without proper cause, to
compensate its insured for a loss covered by the policy, such conduct
may give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.34
Judicial interpretation of bad faith law after Gruenberg has involved
an essentially harmonious process of clarifying the insurer's duties under
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and of establishing
standards for awarding damages in successful bad faith actions.
B. The Nature of the Duty Owed
Unreasonable conduct by the insurer is the gravamen of bad faith
claims.35 Although there is no strict test for breach of the covenant of
good faith,36 the factors that tend to show insurer bad faith include: fail-
ure to thoroughly investigate a claim; failure to evaluate a claim objec-
tively; interpreting policy provisions in an unduly restrictive manner;
purposeful delay in the payments of claims; abusive or coercive practices
29. Id.
30. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
31. Id.
32. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
33. Id. at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1036-37, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85.
34. Id. at 574, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
35. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818-19, 598 P.2d 452, 456, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 486 (1979).
36. Id., 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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to compel the compromise of a claim; and unreasonable conduct during
litigation. 37
The insurer's duty of good faith, however, is not limitless. An erro-
neous denial of a claim for benefits, in itself, does not result in extra-
contractual liability. The denial must be in bad faith (i.e., unreasonable)
to be actionable. 38 Moreover, traditional contract law limitations, such
as the statute of limitations and the requirement of standing to sue, ap-
ply.39 An insurer also can plead as an affirmative defense that the in-
sured has acted in bad faith or has made proper performance of the
insurer's contractual duties impractical. 40
C. Damages
The damages that are recoverable in bad faith actions further reflect
the judiciary's cognizance of the special nature of the insurer-insured re-
lationship. A successful plaintiff in a bad faith action is entitled to re-
cover the insurance policy proceeds. 4 1 Moreover, in first party actions,
which often involve disability payments or other long term benefits to be
paid in the future, future policy benefits may be recovered under a tort
theory, even though such benefits would not be available under contract
law.
4 2
In addition to recovering the proceeds of the policy, a successful
litigant may be compensated for other economic harm caused by the in-
surer's bad faith. In cases like Communale and Crisci, this rule may in-
clude compensation for excess judgments rendered against the insured
arising from the insurer's wrongful refusal to settle. 43
Perhaps the most powerful aspect of California's bad faith law is the
availability of damages for emotional distress. The availability of these
damages recognizes the emotional repercussions that may flow naturally
from a bad faith breach of an insurance contract.44
Finally, if the tortious bad faith of the insurer rises to levels of
extreme indifference to the insured's interests, the court may impose pu-
nitive damages. 45 The justification for the imposition of exemplary dam-
37. S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH LIABILITY § 2.2 (1987).
38. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 818-19, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
39. Austero v. National Casualty Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 511, 133 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1976).
40. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 817 (1985).
41. Jacobs, Bad Faith Considerations, in BAD FAITH LITIGATION AND INSURER VS. IN-
SURER DISPUTES 81 (R.D. Williams, Chairman, ed. 1987).
42. Id.
43. Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
44. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432-34, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 18-19 (1967).
45. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819-20, 598 P.2d 452. 457,
157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979).
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ages is that in cases of particularly egregious bad faith, the insiter
commits "a wrong not only to his insured but ... also... a breach of its
public duty."' 46 Punitive damages thus serve as a powerful means of de-
terring socially unacceptable business practices within the insurance
industry.47
D. Statutory Bad Faith Claims
The emerging common-law action for bad faith has served as an
important check against unregulated insurer misconduct. Insurance car-
riers in California also are subject to regulation via the Unfair Trade
Practices Act, which is codified in the Insurance Code. 48 Section 790.03
of the Act describes certain insurance practices that are prohibited for
being either unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive busi-
ness practices. 49 In 1972, subdivision (h) was enacted enumerating a
number of claims practices that are prohibited expressly under the Act:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy
provisions relating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon com-
munications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt.., reasonable standards for the prompt investi-
gation and processing of claims ....
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage.., within a reasonable time
after proof of loss requirements have been completed and submitted ....
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equi-
table settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts
due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the
amounts ultimately recovered ....
(7) Attempting to settle a claim . ..for less than the amount to
which a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference
to written or printed advertising material ....
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which
was altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured,
his representative, agent or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or benefi-
ciaries ... of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds... a practice of the insurer of ap-
pealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds . ., for the purpose
of compelling them to accept settlements ....
46. Note, supra note 10, at 714.
47. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819-21, 598 P.2d at 457-58, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 482-88.
48. CAL. INS. CODE § 790-790.10 (West 1989).
49. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1989).
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(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims ....
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become
apparent, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to
influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy
coverage.
(13) Failing to provide a reasonable explanation.., for the denial of
a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an
attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of
limitations.50
These unfair claims practices bear a striking resemblance to the
common-law elements of bad faith.5 1 A violation of subdivision (h) of
the Unfair Practices Act almost assuredly also would constitute a viola-
tion of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Yet despite these
obvious parallels, the insurance industry "believed and relied upon the
proposition" that the statute was enforceable only by the Insurance
Commissioner. 52 As early as 1973, however, some appellate courts were
willing to imply a private cause of action under the statute. 53 In 1979,
the California Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in
Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.54 There, the court rejected
the argument that the insurance commissioner had the exclusive author-
ity to enforce the Act and held that a private litigant may maintain a
cause of action under section 790.03(h). 55 In so holding, the court not
only recognized an insured's right to sue his insurer under the statute,
but also extended the implied private cause of action to third party claim-
ants who are essentially strangers to the contract. 56
Because Royal Globe guaranteed the insured's right to maintain a
statutory action sounding in bad faith, and extended this right to third
party claimants, it represents the zenith of judicial recognition of con-
sumer rights in the field of insurance law. But Royal Globe also led to
considerable confusion in California's lower courts 57 and provoked a
50. Id.
51. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text for indicators of bad faith under the
common law.
52. Jacobs, supra note 41, at 79, 96.
53. See Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975):
Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
54. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
55. Id. at 885-88, 592 P.2d at 332-34, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845-47.
56. Id. at 888-91, 592 P.2d at 334-36, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847-49 (A third party claimant is
an individual who has been injured by the insured. A first party claimant is the insured.).
57. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies 46 Cal. 3d 287, 297-98. 758 P.2d
58, 63-67, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 121-22 (1988); Jacobs, supra note 41, at 96-97.
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rash of scholarly criticisms.5 8 Thus, while Royal Globe undoubtedly
pushed the law of bad faith to its furthest reaches, it also spelled the
beginning of bad faith's descent. The judiciary's recent restrictions of
bad faith have been, at least in part, in response to the perceived excesses
of Royal Globe.59 In order to understand the full extent of these recent
judicial limitations on California's bad faith law, however, one must first
turn to the United States Supreme Court and the complicated issue of
ERISA preemption.
II. Bad Faith Law and Erisa Preemption
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a com-
prehensive piece of legislation regulating the administration of employee
benefit plans.60 To effectuate an orderly and uniform administration of
ERISA's mandates, the statute contains a broad preemption clause.6'
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted this pre-
emption clause liberally, invalidating state laws that "relate to" employee
benefit plans because they intrude on Congress' exclusive jurisdiction
over this subject. 62
The United States Supreme Court, while further interpreting the
scope of ERISA preemption, dealt the right of insureds to demand fair
treatment from their insurance carriers by maintaining a cause of action
for bad faith a serious setback when it decided Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux.63 In Pilot Life, the plaintiff sought to bring an action, based on
Mississippi's common law of bad faith, alleging improper processing of a
claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan. A
unanimous Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's action against the
plan's insurer was preempted by ERISA and the case was dismissed. 64
The effect of this holding cannot be overstated. Over 100 million
Americans receive some of their insurance through ERISA-regulated
58. Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention 13 PAC. L.J.
833 (1982); Note, Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit
Against an Insurer by a Third Party Claimant 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161 (1980) (authored by
Joan Marian Price); Note, Bad Faith: Defining Applicable Standards in the Aftermath of
Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 917 (1983) (authored by William J.
Casey); Note, Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies: An Illustration of the
Problems Inherent in the Royal Globe Doctrine, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 371 (1985) (authored by
Joel W. Meskin).
59. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
60. Employees Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1145 (1982 & Supp'.
III 1989).
61. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983); Alesi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-26 (1981).
63. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
64. Id. at 57.
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employee benefit plans. 65 In California, over ninety percent of all work-
ers obtain some significant insurance coverage through their employee
benefit plans. 66 Under Pilot Life, none of these individuals may bring
actions for bad faith. Instead, they must content themselves with suing
under federal law using ERISA's rather limited remedy provisions.
A. ERISA Preemption: Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux
The scope of preemption of state laws is described in three sections
of ERISA. ERISA begins with the broad statement that its provisions
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or here-
after relate to any employee benefit plan."' 67 This sweeping language is
limited by a "saving" clause, which provides that ERISA shall not be
"construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance."' 68 This saving clause is, in turn, limited by
the "deemer" clause, which provides that no employee benefit plan "shall
be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer ... for purposes
of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies."' 69
Thus, under ERISA's preemption provisions a state law is pre-
empted if it "relates to" an employee benefit plan. The saving clause
provides an exception to this broad rule to state laws regulating insur-
ance. But a state cannot simply "deem" a plan to be an insurer in order
to bring the plan within the state's regulatory jurisdiction.
In deciding whether ERISA preempted Mississippi's common law
of bad faith in the context of an employee benefit plan, the Pilot Life
Court focused on three issues: whether the plaintiff's bad faith cause of
action "related to" an employee benefit plan within the meaning of the
preemption provision; whether Mississippi's bad faith law is a law that
"regulates insurance" within the meaning of the saving clause and thus is
exempt from preemption; and what effect should be given to Congress'
apparent intention that ERISA's civil enforcement provisions provide
the sole remedies available to aggrieved employee benefit plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries. 70
Relying on two previous Supreme Court cases that construed the
boundaries of the preemption clause very broadly, 7' the Pilot Life Court
summarily concluded that the Mississippi common law of bad faith
65. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1986 S[ATIS'ICAI ABSTRACT 101 (1985).
66. The Recorder (San Francisco), Dec. 16, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
68. 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(A).
69. 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(B).
70. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-57 (1987).
71. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Mlanhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
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raised in the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently related to an employee ben-
efit plan to fall within ERISA's general preemption provision. 72
The Court noted that under its earlier holdings the preemption
clause was given an "expansive sweep. . such that a state law 'relate[s]
to' a benefit plan ... if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan."73 The Court also emphasized that "the preemption clause is not
limited to 'state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit
plans.' -74 Thus, due to the breadth of its earlier holdings the Court was
able to conclude that the plaintiff's action was preempted because of its
proximate relation to an employee benefit plan.
The Court then considered the primary issue before it: whether the
bad faith cause of action was a means of regulating insurance within the
meaning of the saving clause and thus not preempted by ERISA. In
determining this question, the Court relied on its earlier holding in Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.75
In Metropolitan Life, the Court established a two-part test for deter-
mining whether a law regulates insurance within the meaning of ER-
ISA's saving clause. First, the Court considered whether, from a
"common sense" point of view, the law in question regulated insurance. 76
Second, the Court applied a three-part analysis that had been developed
for determining whether a law regulates insurance in connection with the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which exempts insurance companies from fed-
eral antitrust laws.77  The three McCarran-Ferguson factors are:
whether the insurance practice transfers or spreads policyholder risk;
whether the practice is an integral part of the insurer-insured relation-
ship; and whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry.78 Examination of Metropolitan Life's application of these fac-
tors reveals that no single factor is dispositive; if application of this test
indicates that a law regulates insurance, then the law is properly within
the saving clause and is not preempted by ERISA.79
In applying this test, the Pilot Life Court first concluded that a
"common sense" understanding of the phrase "regulates insurance" does
not support the conclusion that Mississippi's law of bad faith falls within
72. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47-48.
73. Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 47-48 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)).
75. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
76. Id. at 740-41. In Metropolitan Life, the Massachusetts law at issue required that
health insurance companies provide certain minimum health care benefits. The Court rejected
defendant Metropolitan Life's assertion that ERISA preempted the statute. 471 U.S. at 746.
77. Id. at 743. The McCarran-Ferguson Act also guarantees the exclusive jurisdiction of
the states over the regulation of insurance companies. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1988).
78. Id. at 743 (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
79. Id.
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the saving clause. 80 The Court interpreted "common sense" and the
third McCarran-Ferguson factor to constitute essentially the same re-
quirement: to be classified as a law regulating insurance, a law must not
merely affect the insurance industry, it also must be "specifically directed
toward that industry.""' The Court conceded that Mississippi's law of
bad faith had been identified with the insurance industry, but it noted
that the roots of the law were "firmly planted in the general principles of
Mississippi tort and contract law."' 82 Thus, because Mississippi's law of
bad faith was not directed specifically at the insurance industry, it failed
to satisfy the requirements of both the "common sense" test and the
third McCarran-Ferguson factor.
Without any supporting discussion, the Court proceeded to declare
that the law in question did not affect the spreading of policyholder
risk.83 Consequently, Mississippi's law of bad faith also failed to satisfy
the second McCarran-Ferguson factor.
The Court was a bit more judicious as to whether the state's com-
mon law of bad faith had an integral effect on the insurer-insured rela-
tionship. Because an insurer may incur liability for breach of contract
under bad faith law, the Court determined that the bad faith cause of
action affected the insurer-insured relationship. 84 The Court was unwill-
ing, however, to characterize the law as having an integral effect, and
described its effect on the insurer-insured relationship as being "attenu-
ated at best."8 5
The Court summed up by stating that, at most, the Mississippi law
satisfied only one of the three McCarran-Ferguson factors and, according
to Metropolitan Life, could not be characterized as a law regulating in-
surance. 86 Thus, the plaintiff's cause of action was not within the saving
clause, and consistent with the Court's earlier finding that the law "re-
lated to" an employee benefit plan, it was preempted by ERISA.
Having effectively decided the case, the court could have stopped
there. Instead, it continued, stating: "[I]n the present case, moreover,
we are obliged in interpreting the saving clause to consider not only the
factors by which we were guided in Metropolitan Life, but also the role of
80. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987).
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. "An insurance industry practice or law spreads or transfers policyholder risk
where the practice or law affects or manipulates risk allocation in a particular insurance mar-
ket." Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith: Only Congress Can Save Us After Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1343. 1364 (1988) (authored by Robert L.
Aldisert).
84. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50-51.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 51.
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the saving clause in ERISA as a whole."'87 The Court then proceeded to
reinterpret radically the saving clause by asserting that Congress in-
tended ERISA's remedies to be the sole form of recourse for aggrieved
plan participants. 88 In making this determination the Court explored
ERISA's legislative history.
First," the Court suggested that the comprehensive nature of ER-
ISA's civil enforcement scheme provides "strong evidence that Congress
did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incor-
porate expressly."'89 The Court further concluded that the availability of
diverse state-law remedies for bad faith would undermine the creation of
a uniform body of federal law and thus deter the formation of employee
benefit plans.90 Finally, the Court found in ERISA's legislative history a
congressional intent that the preemptive force of ERISA parallel that of
the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA).91 Section 301 of the
LMRA has a preemptive force so powerful that it displaces entirely any
state law that requires a court to interpret a labor contract. 92 By way of
this analogy, the Court found additional support for concluding that
Congress intended ERISA's remedy provisions to be exclusive in their
application.
Because the Court's discussion of the exclusivity of ERISA remedies
was not necessary to decide the case, the implications of its determina-
tion of congressional intent are unclear. Nonetheless, the Court's discus-
sion suggests that the congressional policy behind making ERISA's
remedies exclusive is powerful enough to preempt even state laws that
otherwise would escape preemption by coming within the saving clause.
This Note will now consider the impact of Pilot Life, first arguing that it
should be given a restricted interpretation, and then examining how it
has been interpreted in California.
B. Interpeting Pilot Life
Although the full effect of the Pilot Life decision remained unclear,
numerous articles criticizing Pilot Life appeared soon after its publica-
tion.93 Nonetheless, due to the unanimity of the decision, Americans
87. Id.
88. Id. at 51-57.
89. Id. at 54 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 54-55. The LMRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
92. Id. at 55-56; see 29 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
93. See, e.g., Chittenden, ERISA Preemption: The Demise of Bad Faith in Group Insur-
ance Actions, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517 (1988); Klein, Rosen & Russell, Pilot Life's Dramatic
Impact: The Supreme Court Revolutionizes Insurance Bad Faith Law, 10 L.A. LAW. 37
(1987); Nelson, Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux-The Supreme Court's Federalization of
Employee Benefit Law, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 507 (1988); Note, BlinFaith Conquers Bad Faith:
Only Congress Can Save Us After Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
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probably will have to cope with Pilot Life for some time. The key, then,
in determining the final effects of Pilot Life, particularly on bad faith in
insurance actions will depend upon the breadth of interpretation given
the Supreme Court's holding.
The first two issues decided by the Pilot Life Court, whether Missis-
sippi's bad faith law "relates to" an employee benefit plan and whether it
is a law regulating insurance within the meaning of the savings clause,
are not problematic. The Court's resolution of these preemption issues
by applying the Metropolitan Life test is consistent with other Supreme
Court holdings and the text of ERISA itself.94 If one reads Pilot Life in
this limited context, a state's law of bad faith, which, unlike Mississippi's
law, is directed specifically at the insurance industry and is capable of
satisfying the McCarran-Ferguson factors, would be able to escape pre-
emption by coming within the saving clause. California's bad faith law
possibly would be safe from ERISA preemption had the Court stopped
its analysis at this point.
On the other hand, the Court's analysis of the exclusivity of ERISA
remedies is entirely inconsistent with its own prior holdings, other im-
portant federal laws, and the terms of ERISA itself.
Throughout Pilot Life the Supreme Court purported to rely on its
earlier decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.95
This premise is faulty. Despite expressly affirming Metropolitan Life, the
decision in Pilot Life conflicts with Metropolitan Life on a number of
important points. 96 For example, the Metropolitan Life Court stated
that, "[t]he presumption is against preemption, and we are not inclined
to read limitations into federal statutes in order to enlarge their preemp-
tive scope."' 97 More importantly, Metropolitan Life stands for the propo-
sition that if a state law meets the test for a law regulating insurance, it is
exempt from preemption.9 8
If Pilot Life's discussion of ERISA remedies is interpreted broadly,
the essential holding of Metropolitan Life is undermined. To argue that
ERISA preempts any state law granting remedies to employee-plan par-
ticipants, regardless of whether the state law regulates insurance or not,
limits the vitality of Metropolitan Life to only those laws that do not
provide remedies to employee-plan participants. A broad reading of Pi-
lot Life would allow the Supreme Court to alter the meaning of ERISA's
saving clause; preemption of a state law would turn on whether it pro-
1343 (1988) (authored by Robert L. Aldisert); Note ERISA Preemption-Congress' Cue to
Reassess ERISA's Preemptive Effect, U. KAN. L. REV. 611 (1988); Angel, Pensions: "Monster"
Case May Affect Most US. Workers, 10 Penn. L.J. Reporter, May 18, 1987, at 12, col. 1.
94. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
95. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
96. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
97. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985).
98. Id. at 746.
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vides a remedy, not, as contained within the statute, whether the law
regulates insurance. Since it is difficult for a law to "regulate" without
providing remedies, a broad reading of Pilot Life would completely un-
dermine the holding of Metropolitan Life.
Furthermore, a broad interpretation of Pilot Life also would conflict
with the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was en-
acted to exempt insurance companies from federal antitrust laws and to
confer upon the states jurisdiction for the regulation of insurance compa-
nies.99 The mandate of the Act is clear. First, the Act provides that the
insurance industry shall be subject to state legislation.100 Second, the
Act prohibits any federal law from intruding upon state jurisdiction in
insurance regulation, "unless such Act specifically relates to the business
of insurance."' 01
ERISA is not a law specifically related to the business of insurance,
because it governs noninsurance aspects of employee benefit plans.
Moreover, a broad interpretation of Pilot Life, clearly would allow ER-
ISA to impair a state's right to regulate insurance companies through
application of its bad faith law. Thus, a broad reading of Pilot Life
would contravene the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Additionally, the terms of ERISA itself suggest the inappropriate-
ness of interpreting Pilot Life as allowing wide preemption of state bad
faith law. Despite a rather selective legislative history, the Pilot Life
Court was able to imply only that ERISA's remedies should be the sole
form of recourse for a plan participant alleging bad faith processing of a
claim. 10 2 Contrast this conclusion with the text of ERISA's saving
clause which states that ERISA "shall not be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any state which regulates
insurance."10 3
Two fundamental precepts of statutory construction are that courts
are to interpret legislation, first and foremost, according to its plain
meaning, and that the express terms of a statute supercede implied
terms."' 4 The plain meaning of the saving clause prohibits any interpre-
tation of Pilot Life that would allow the preemption of a state law regu-
lating insurance.
Finally, there are important policy reasons for limiting the scope of
Pilot Life. A broad reading of Pilot Life would sacrifice important con-
sumer protections obtained through the law of bad faith. The Pilot Life
Court suggests that the consumer's interest in prompt and fair claims
99. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pierno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1981).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (a) (1982).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (b).
102. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
104. Mead Corp. v. B.E. Tilley, 109 S. Ct. 2156, 2162 (1989); Bank of America v. United
States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 (1982).
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procedures is outweighed by the public's interest in encouraging the for-
mation of employee benefit plans. 105 The Court concluded that this con-
gressional policy would be "completely undermined" if employee plan
participants could access remedies under state law that were unavailable
under ERISA. 10 6 A brief consideration of the purposes behind ERISA's
preemption provisions sheds considerable doubt on this conclusion.
ERISA was enacted to require disclosure of and provide safeguards
with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of em-
ployee benefit plans. 107 Congress sought to prevent abuses of the special
responsibilities held by those dealing with the plans. Specifically, Con-
gress sought to prevent self-dealing, imprudent investing, and misappro-
priation of funds by plan fiduciaries. 10 8
The initial formation of employee benefit plans, however, remains
voluntary. 10 9 Because ERISA does not compel the formation of such
plans, Congress sought to encourage plan formation by easing the bur-
dens of multi-state administration.11 0 Congress reasoned that a uniform
body of federal law governing actions arising under employee benefit
plans would accomplish this purpose because employers would not have
to administer their plans differently in each state, in order to comply with
varying state laws. "' This was the goal Congress sought to achieve by
enacting ERISA's broad preemption provision.
Considering Congress' intention of encouraging plan formation, it is
difficult to see how permitting state law actions for bad faith would un-
dermine this policy. Bad Faith actions are directed at insurer miscon-
duct, not the mismanagement of employee benefit plans. 112 Thus, the
existence of diverse state law actions for bad faith would not adversely
affect the ease of employer administration of benefit plans or demand the
continuous allocation of company assets: the two results Congress sought
to avoid by enacting ERISA's broad preemption provision. 113
Granted, because insurance, in this context, is obtained through an
employee benefit plan it does "relate to" ERISA. Because bad faith ac-
tions address neither management or operation of such plans, however,
this "relationship" is negligible.
This tenuous relationship between bad faith actions and the uni-
form, multi-state administration of employee benefit plans contrasts
sharply with the very clear consumer protections that bad faith provides.
105. See Note, supra note 83, at 1374.
106. Id.
107. Ft. Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
108. Id. at 15.
109. Id. at 12
110. Id. at 8-11
111. Id.
112. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
113. Ft. Halifax, 482 U.S. at 12-14.
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Thus, the slight increase in the ease of administering ERISA plans would
seem to be outweighed by the important regulatory function of bad faith.
In sum, a broad interpretation of Pilot Life would conflict with es-
tablished federal laws, the Supreme Court's own precedent, the plain
meaning of ERISA's saving clause, and a common sense balancing of the
interests involved.
C. Interpretations of Pilot Life in Light of California Insurance Code
Section 790.03(h)
It was inevitable that federal and state courts would be forced to
resolve the question of how broadly Pilot Life should be interpreted. Pi-
lot Life, and to some extent Congress itself, had created an unavoidable
conflict. On one hand, Congress apparently intended ERISA's remedies
to be the exclusive form of relief in actions by employee plan partici-
pants. On the other hand, a whole body of federal law, including ERISA
itself, guaranteed states the right to regulate insurance companies
In California resolution of this conflict was particularly important.
Section 790.03(h) of the Unfair Practices Act gives Californians, un-
like Mississipians, access to a statutory based law of bad faith. This is
significant because the Pilot Life court had held that Mississippi's com-
mon-law action of bad faith was not a law regulating insurance, and thus
not within the protection of the saving clause, because it was not directed
specifically at the insurance industry. 14
Section 790.03(h), on the other hand, appears in the insurance code
and thus is specifically directed at the insurer-insured relationship. A
private cause of action under section 790.03(h) would. likely come within
the saving clause's prohibition that "ERISA shall not be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of the state which regulates
insurance." 15
Federal and state courts split, however, as to whether ERISA
preempts causes of action under section 790.03(h).1 6 Two cases in par-
ticular, Roberson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States117 and Goodrich v. General Telephone Co.,118 exemplify different
ways that courts have tried to resolve this conflict.
114. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
116. The following cases held that ERISA did not preempt § 790.03(h): Lee v. Prudential
Life Insurance Co., 673 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Graves v. Blue Cross Health Ins. Co.
688 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Presti v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 163 (N.D. Cal. 1985). For cases holding that ERISA did preempt § 790.03(h), see
Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988); Misic v. Building
Service Employee Health, 789 F.2d. 1374 (9th Cir. 1986); Russell v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 722 F.2d.482 (9th Cir. '1983); Roberson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 661 F. Supp.
416 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
117. 661 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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(1) Roberson-A Broad Reading of Pilot Life
In Roberson, the plaintiff had brought an action against his group
health insurer for wrongful denial of benefits. After removal from state
to federal court, the federal district court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment and concluded that ERISA preempts actions by
plan participants brought under the Unfair Practices Act." 19
The plaintiff in Roberson did not contest the assertion that his cause
of action "related to" an employee benefit plan. Nor did he contest the
theory that, under Pilot Life, all of his claims based on California's com-
mon law of bad faith were preempted. 20 The plaintiff did argue, how-
ever, that section 790.03(h) of the Unfair Practices Act is a law
regulating insurance and, as such, escapes preemption by coming within
the saving clause. 121
Accordingly, the Roberson court began its discussion by applying
the two-part saving clause analysis developed in Metropolitan Life. 122
The court conceded that section 790.03(h) has an "obvious" connection
to insurance regulation and that it would "strain logic" to argue that it is
not directed specifically at the insurance industry. 123 Thus, section
790.03(h) satisfied both the "common-sense" test, and the third McCar-
ran-Ferguson factor of being specifically directed at the insurance
industry.
The court determined, however, that "it is unlikely that section
790.03(h) meets either of the other two factors of the McCarran-Fergu-
son test."1 24 The court distinguished the mandated mental health bene-
fits law in Metropolitan Life and found that section 790.03(h) does not
affect the transfer of policyholder risk. The basis of this distinction was
that the Massachusetts law in Metropolitan Life had regulated the sub-
stantive terms of insurance policies, while section 790.03(h) merely regu-
lated enforcement of claims grievances in a procedural manner. 125 Thus,
the court concluded that section 790.03(h) did not appear to transfer pol-
icyholder risk.
Next, the Roberson court decided that because section 790.03(h)
provides specific standards for the processing of claims, "it affects the
insurer-insured relationship more profoundly than the Mississippi bad
faith law in Pilot Life."' 126 The court determined, however, that in enact-
118. 195 Cal. App. 3d 675, 241 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1987), overruled sub nom. Commercial Life
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 473, 764 P.2d 1059, 253 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988).
119. Roberson, 661 F. Supp. at 424-25.
120. Id. at 418-19.
121. Id. at 419.
122. Id. at 422-23.
123. Id. at 422.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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ing the saving clause Congress was concerned with laws that "center
around the contract of insurance."1 27 Because section 790.03(h) does
not "regulate the terms of the contract itself," the court reasoned that it
did not "regulate the business of insurance as that term is defined under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act."1 28
But the court did not base its final determination of the issue on its
saving clause analysis. Rather the court treated as dispositive the Pilot
Life ruling that Congress intended ERISA remedies to be exclusive in
actions by employee benefit plan participants.1 29 In so doing, the Rober-
son court interpreted Pilot Life broadly and concluded that "even assum-
ing that section 790.03(h) regulates insurance and is therefore within the
scope of the saving clause, it must be preempted for infringing on the
same exclusive civil remedy provisions that were dispositive in Pilot
Life."130
(2) Goodrich-a limited reading of Pilot Life
The facts in Goodrich v. General Telephone Co. 131 nearly duplicate
those of Pilot Life and Roberson. Yet, a unanimous California Court of
Appeals held that ERISA did not preempt an action by an employee
benefit plan participant under section 790.03(h). 132 As in Roberson, the
Goodrich court applied the two-part saving clause analysis from Metro-
politan Life and Pilot Life to section 790.03(h). The court similarly con-
sidered Congress' apparent intention that ERISA remedies be exclusive,
but by distinguishing the holding in Pilot Life and by refusing to ignore
the plain meaning of the saving clause, the Goodrich court came to a
different conclusion.
The Goodrich court, in accord with Roberson, determined that sec-
tion 790.03(h) regulated insurance under a common-sense meaning of the
phrase and was directed specifically at the insurance industry. 33 The
court noted that the Unfair Practices Act is described expressly as a law
regulating insurance. Thus, the court stated that "common sense would
be severely strained if we were to hold the act is not a law regulating
insurance in the face of an explicit legislature declaration that it is.''134
Accordingly, section 790.03(h) passed both the common-sense test and
the third McCarran-Ferguson factor. The court also agreed with Rober-
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 423.
130. Id. at 424.
131. 195 Cal. App. 3d 675, 678-79, 241 Cal. Rptr. 640, 641 (1987), overruled sub nom.
Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 473, 764 P.2d 1059, 253 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1988).
132. Id. at 683, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
133. Id. at 683-84, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 644-45.
134. Id. at 684, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
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son, without explanation, that section 790.03(h) did not affect a transfer
of policyholder risk and thus failed to pass the second McCarran-Fergu-
son test. 1
35
The court refuted, however, the Roberson court's claim that section
790.03(h) did not have an integral effect on the insurer-insured relation-
ship. First, the Goodrich court noted that section 790.03(h) compels cer-
tain good faith claims practices within the insurance industry by
''specifically regulating the obligations of an insurance company to its
policyholders." 136 Thus, section 790.03(h) directly and integrally affects
the insurer-insured relationship.
In addition, the court directly refuted Roberson's claim that section
790.03(h) is not substantive because it does not regulate the terms of an
insurance contract. The court noted that, " '[i]t is well settled that insur-
ance policies are governed by the statutory and decisional law in force at
the time the policy is issued. 'Such provisions are read into each policy
issued thereunder, and become part of the contract.' 137 Thus, the pro-
visions of section 790.03(h) are incorporated into every policy drawn up
in California and regulate the terms of the contract itself. In summing
up its saving clause analysis, the court stated that section 790.03(h) "fits
the other two criteria mentioned in Pilot Life so well we have no diffi-
culty concluding it is a law relating to the business of insurance within
the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and, therefore within the
savings clause of ERISA."'' 38
Because the Goodrich court had determined that section 790.03(h) is
a law regulating insurance within the meaning of the saving clause, it was
able to distinguish Pilot Life's holding. Specifically, the court reasoned
that Pilot Life's analysis, particularly in regard to ERISA remedies, had
arisen in connection with a state law that the court had determined did
not regulate insurance. 39 Thus, the Pilot Life Court's conclusion that
the exclusivity of ERISA remedies was dispositive in that case did not
control a case in which the remedy involved a statute that, like section
790.03(h), regulates insurance and therefore is within the express protec-
tion of the saving clause. 140
The court, free from the compulsion of adopting Pilot Life in total,
proceeded to consider the conflicting congressional policies of exclusive
ERISA remedies and Congress' "long-standing policy of deference to
state regulation of insurance."' 4 1 The court noted that Congress had re-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 688, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (quoting Interinsurance Exchange v. Ohio Cas. Co.,
58 Cal. 2d 142, 148, 373 P.2d 640, 643, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1962)).
138. Id. at 684, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
139. Id. at 686-87, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 687, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
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iterated this policy in two separate sections of ERISA's preemption pro-
vision. First, the language of the saving clause was clear: laws that
regulate insurance are exempt from preemption. 142 Second, section
1144(d) of ERISA prohibited it from "impairing or superseding any law
of the United States."1 43
The Goodrich Court reasoned that because the McCarran-Ferguson
Act prohibits Congress from passing laws impairing state laws regulating
insurance, unless the law is specifically directed at insurance, and because
ERISA is not specifically directed at insurance, it cannot supersede sec-
tion 790.03(h).'44 Thus, because section 790.03(h) meets the McCarran-
Ferguson test for regulating insurance, and correspondingly is within the
saving clause, it cannot be preempted by ERISA.
The Goodrich court was aware that its holding conflicted with Con-
gress' intention that ERISA remedies be the exclusive means of recourse
for actions by plan participants. 45 The court noted, however, that this
conflict is "the inevitable result of inherently inconsistent goals expressed
in the ERISA preemption provisions."' 146 In balancing these competing
congressional policies, the Goodrich court found the clear and unambigu-
ous mandates of the saving clause and the McCarran-Ferguson Act more
persuasive than the Roberson court's finding of some "unspoken excep-
tion to the insurance saving clause."' 147 In reference to the Roberson
court's conclusion that section 790.03(h) could be preempted despite be-
ing a law regulating insurance within the meaning of the saving clause,
the court stated, "We have great difficulty with the concept section
790.03, subdivision (h) can be both within and without the scope of the
preemption clause. The concept is not only illogical but in direct conflict
with the unambiguous language of the statute."'' 48
The different conclusions reached by the Roberson and Goodrich
courts result from conflicting interpretations of both the saving clause
and the scope of Pilot Life's discussion of ERISA remedies. The issues
were defined clearly and the stage was set for the California Supreme
Court to resolve this conflict.
III. California's Recent Denial of a Private Cause of Action
Under Section 790.03(h) and Its Effect on Bad Faith
Three months before the California Supreme Court was scheduled
to address this complicated problem, the issue was rendered moot by the
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 684-85, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
145. Id. at 686-87, 241 Cal. Rptr. 647.
146. Id. at 687, 241 Cal. Rptr. 647.
147. Id. at 688, 241 Cal. Rptr. 648.
148. Id.
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court's opinion in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Compa-
nies. 149 In Moradi, the court overturned its earlier decision in Royal
Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court 150 and declared that section
790.03(h) of the Unfair Practices Act no longer sustained a private cause
of action in favor of either first or third party claimants. 151
The combined effect of Moradi andf Pilot Life completely bars em-
ployee benefit plan participants from bringing bad faith actions. Pilot
Life had prohibited plan participants from maintaining a common-law
cause of action on a theory of ERISA preemption. Moradi now denies
these individuals access to a statutory-based action for bad faith on an
entirely different theory, without considering the implications of its hold-
ing on employee plan participants.
A. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies
The court's reasons for overturning Royal Globe, and with it the
implied private cause of action under section 790.03(h), were varied. The
major basis for the court's decision to overrule Royal Globe was a
number of "adverse consequences" that the Moradi court believed Royal
Globe had created.
Because Royal Globe permitted third parties who had been injured
by the insured to sue the insurer under 790.03(h), the decision subjected
insurance carriers to the threat of multiple litigation. 52 The Moradi
court reasoned that an insurer could be coerced into accepting inflated
settlements, fearing a suit on behalf of its insured, and then a bad faith
suit as well. This in turn would raise the cost of doing business in Cali-
fornia, with the companies passing the added expense on to innocent
consumers. 153
Another adverse consequence of Royal Globe's holding was that it
pitted the insured's interests against those of the insurer.
[O]ur holding in Royal Globe that insurers owe a direct duty to third
party claimants ... tends to create a serious conflict of interest for the
insured, who must not only protect the interests of its insurer, but also
must safeguard its own interests from the adverse claims of the third
party claimant. This conflict disrupts the settlement process and may
disadvantage the insured. 154
The court also considered certain "analytical difficulties" faced by
lower courts when presiding over actions under section 790.03(h).155
149. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
150. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979); see supra text accompanying
notes 54-59.
151. 46 Cal. 3d at 292, 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
152. Id. at 301-02, 758 P.2d at 66-67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
155. Id. at 303-04, 758 P.2d at 67-68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
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Most of these difficulties arose as courts sought to define the scope of a
Royal Globe action. For example, Royal Globe held that a third party
claimant may not sue the insurer under the statute until the suit against
the insured was concluded. Courts, however, came to conflicting inter-
pretations of when a suit is concluded. 156 The Moradi court reasoned
that these and other difficulties in interpreting the scope of an action
under section 790.03(h) involve a delicate balancing of competing poli-
cies best left to the legislature. 157
In addition, to those adverse consequences created by Royal Globe,
the court reconsidered the legislative history of section 790.03(h).15 8 The
Moradi court disagreed with Royal Globe's conclusion that the wording
of the statute clearly implied a private cause of action. 159 Moreover, the
court pointed out that the Royal Globe decision overlooked the fact that
the state's legislative analyst had described the statute as contemplating
only administrative enforcement.' 60
The court also noted that a bill expressly overruling Royal Globe
had passed the California Senate, but became stalled in the Assembly
Ways and Means Committee before being brought to a vote.' 6' The
court refused to draw the inference requested by the plaintiff that these
developments suggested the legislature's approval of Royal Globe. Simi-
larly, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the legislature had
tacitly consented to Royal Globe by amending subsection (h) without ad-
dressing the Royal Globe issues stating that, "the legislature may have
passively acquiesced in Royal Globe, but it has never expressly or im-
pliedly adopted the holding in that case."' 162 In sum, the court found the
legislative history was at best inconclusive, and left the correctness of
Royal Globe's holding in considerable doubt.' 63 Thus, the Moradi court
concluded that the adverse effects and logical inconsistencies generated
by Royal Globe, when considered in light of an inconclusive legislative
intent to create a private cause of action under section 790.03(h), justified
overturning its earlier decision. 64
156. Id. at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
157. Id. at 303-04, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
158. Id. at 300-01, 758 P.2d at 65-66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
159. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
160. Id. at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
161. Id. at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24.
162. Id. at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
163. Id., 758 P.2d 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
164. Id. at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126. Interestingly, the court declared
that its holding would be prospective only, and that actions filed before its decision became
final would be decided under the old rule of Royal Globe. Id. at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal.
Rptr. at 127. In the interest of those pending actions, the court then proceeded to resolve
many of the analytical difficulties that plagued suits brought under section 790.03(h). Id. at
305-13, 758 P.2d at 69-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-33. The court determined that, for purposes
of instigating a "Royal Globe action," settlement is an insufficient conclusion of the underlying
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B. Commercial Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of San Diego
Three months later, the California Supreme Court, having agreed to
decide the issue of ERISA preemption and actions by employee plan par-
ticipants under section 790.03(h) before the Moradi decision, addressed
the problem in Commercial Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of San
Diego. 65 In Commercial Life, the court sided with Roberson and de-
clared that ERISA preempts actions brought under 790.03(h) when the
action asserts a claim arising under an employee benefit plan. 166
Of course, the court's decision that ERISA prevents employee bene-
fit plans participants from bringing a private cause of action against the
plan insurer under section 790.03(h) was all but meaningless in light of
its recent decision in Moradi barring all private actions under section
790.03(h). 167
Most of the majority's eleven page decision merely recounts the
United States Supreme Court's earlier holdings in Pilot Life and Metro-
politan Life168 and restates with approval the Roberson court's analysis of
section 790.03(h) in this context. 169
Finally, the court turned to the crucial issue of how to reconcile the
savings clause's mandate that ERISA shall not preempt state laws regu-
lating insurance with the Pilot Life Court's sweeping statements regard-
ing the exclusivity of ERISA's remedy provisions. Here the court,
ignoring the Goodrich court's exhaustive rebuttal of Roberson, chose to
interpret Pilot Life as broadly as possible. The Commercial Life court
though technically superfluous in that case, was completely controlling
in this, factually distinguishable, case. 170
Accordingly, the court held that the federal interest in plan uni-
formity served by ERISA preemption superseded the state's interest in
regulating insurance. 17  The court refused to acknowledge how in so
holding it might conflict with ERISA's saving clause. Instead, the court
distinguished between state laws that regulate the substance of insurance
policies from state laws that provide procedural remedies; holding that
the saving clause protects the former from ERISA protection but not the
latter. 172
action. There must be a conclusive judicial determination of the insured's liability before the
third-party can bring an action against the insurer under section 790.03(h). Id. at 306, 758
P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
165. 47 Cal. 3d 473, 764 P.2d 1059, 253 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988).
166. Id. at 472-73, 764 P.2d at 1064, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
167. Id. at 484-85, 764 P.2d at 1066, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
168. Id. 474-81, 764 P.2d at 1059-63, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 682-86.
169. Id. at 481-82, 764 P.2d at 1063-65, Cal. Rptr. at 686-89.
170. Id. at 484, 764 P.2d at 1066, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
171. Id., 764 P.2d at 1066, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
172. Id., 764 P.2d at 1066, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
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IV. Rebuilding Bad Faith -
The fall from grace of bad faith actions against insurance companies
is now complete. The combined effect of Pilot Life, Moradi, and Com-
mercial Life precludes a large percentage of Californians from bringing
bad faith actions against their insurers. 173 Both the common-law and
statutory avenues of relief that had been available to employee plan par-
ticipants now are closed. 174
Theoretically, this result could be avoided by applying a more co-
herent framework of analysis. Practically, reversing the effects of these
judicial decisions will be extremely difficult. This Note proposes that a
more sound process of judicial reasoning would better serve the citizens
of California by restoring the scope of consumer protections afforded by
the law of bad faith.
The fundamental premise of this proposal is that California's law of
bad faith provides an important and equitable resolution to problems
arising in the context of insurance contracts. Unless one views the law of
bad faith as an important consumer right, any attempt at restoring its
vitality, at best, is misguided.
Common sense suggests that the law of bad faith protects an impor-
tant consumer right. The insurer-insured relationship is different than
other contractual relationships. The insured is in many regards at the
mercy of his insurance carrier. She is unable to negotiate the terms of
her contract. 175 Moreover, a bad faith breach of the contract not only
deprives the insured of the peace of mind for which she contracted, it
may also proximately cause a host of other, extra-contractual damages
that would otherwise go unremedied. 76
Because of the unique bargaining position held by'insurers, there is a
strong public interest in preventing insurer misconduct. Commensurate
with this public duty, insurers are properly held to a higher standard of
conduct than parties to an ordinary commercial transaction. 177 Without
the sword of bad faith, consumers contract at the mercy of the corporate
conscience of the insurance industry.
Cognizant of these realities, the California judiciary developed the
law of bad faith. Yet, the present state of affairs presents an anomalous
situation. For the sole reason that one receives her insurance through an
employee benefit plan rather than through an individual contract, the
insured is deprived of the rights of recompensation and the protections
that bad faith law provides. One federal district court considering the
incongruity of this result stated,
173. See supra note 65-66 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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[We] cannot believe that the consumer protections afforded California
policyholders were meant to be withdrawn from those persons whose
coverage was provided under an employee benefit plan. The interest in
ERISA plan uniformity cannot be secured at the expense of the uni-
form state regulation of those insurers choosing to write policies in
California. 178
The first step in restoring bad faith law in California necessarily in-
volves a reconsideration of Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Companies. 79 Specifically, Moradi could and should have limited its
overruling of Royal Globe to prohibit only those actions under section
790.03(h) brought by third party claimants.
It is worthwhile to note that almost all of the "adverse conse-
quences" upon which the Moradi court ultimately relied in overturning
Royal Globe stem from third party actions. 80 The problems of multiple
litigation and conflict of interest, which Royal Globe created, apply only
to suits by third party claimants. It is the second suit against the insurer,
brought by the third party claimant that coerces higher settlements,
raises the costs of insurance, and compromises the loyalty of the
insurer. 8 1'
Similarly, the "analytical difficulties" created by Royal Globe con-
cern the establishment of standards governing actions by third party
claimants. 8 2 Conversely, the common-law action for bad faith provides
ample guidance for courts adjudicating first party actions under section
790.03(h) because "violations of the statute against insureds also consti-
tute bad faith under the common law and vice-versa."' 83
The majority's legislative history analysis was inconclusive, and the
dissent in Moradi makes a strong case for continuing to imply a private
cause of action, based on both the language of section 790.03(h) and sub-
sequent legislative actions. 84 Nonetheless, the court's discontinuation of
an implied private cause of action under section 790.03(h) clearly derives
from those adverse consequences that Royal Globe created. By failing to
distinguish first and third party claims, the important statutory right of
178. Presti v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 605 F. Supp. 163, 168 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
179. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
180. Id. at 301-02, 758 P.2d at 66-67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 303-04, 758 P.2d. at 67-68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
183. Jacobs, supra note 41, at 79 (emphasis added).
184. Moradi, 46 Cal. 3d at 313-21, 758 P.2d at 75-80, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133-38 (Mosk, J.
dissenting) (Justice Mosk refuted the majority's claim that the legislature has not tacitly con-
sented to Royal Globe by its subsequent actions. Citing considerable authority, Justice Mosk
argued that in amending legislation, the legislature is presumed to know of judicial decisions
affecting the amended statute. Thus, Justice Mosk concluded, the failure of the legislature to
address Royal Globe in its subsequent considerations of section 790.03(h) "is indicative of an
intent to leave the law as it stands in all aspects not amended." Id. at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 136.).
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insureds to sue their insurers was destroyed because of its association
with the more troublesome claims of third parties.
The majority did not consider the distinction necessary because it
felt that other forms of legal redress were adequate to deter insurer mis-
conduct. 8 5 The court referred to the enforcement powers of the Insur-
ance Commissioner and to the continuing vitality of common-law actions
of bad faith in support of this conclusion.18 6 These assurances, however,
provide little comfort. Since the enactment of section 790.03 in 1959,
there is no reported case in which the Insurance Commissioner has taken
action against an insurer for unfair or deceptive claims practices. 8 7
Moreover, one can assume that the Moradi court was aware of Pilot Life
and the important issue pending before it as to whether ERISA pre-
empted actions under section 790.03(h). Thus, the court's assurance that
their decision does not impair common-law claims of bad faith simply
does not apply to those Californians who receive their insurance through
employee benefit plans.
It is not unreasonable to expect the court to consider these broader
policy issues when making its decision, particularly when the basis of
their decision is a policy against permitting a continuance of the adverse
consequences of Royal Globe. By failing to distinguish first party claims
in their decision and by ignoring the far reaching effect of denying all
private causes of action under the statute, the court's judgment reflects
an interest in the policy concerns of insurance carriers only. A more
equitable and internally consistent resolution of the problems created by
Royal Globe would be to overrule that case only in so far as it applies to
actions by third party claimants.
If Moradi is limited to continue permitting first party actions by the
insured against its insurer under section 790.03(h), the final step in re-
storing important consumer protections to employee plan participants
would be the overruling of Commercial Life.188 Had Moradi not ren-
dered the issue moot, Commercial Life's consideration of ERISA pre-
emption and section 790.03(h) plainly would be inadequate. 8 9 If the
issue could be revived either by limiting Moradi or via an express legisla-
tive grant of a private cause of action under section 790.03(h), further
analysis of the issue would suggest that Commercial Life should be
overturned.
To understand why Commercial Life should be overruled, and why
the Goodrich court's analysis of the issue is superior, a brief reconsidera-
tion of the primary issues involved is helpful. According to Pilot Life,
185. Id. at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 317, 758 P.2d. at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
188. 47 Cal. 3d 473, 764 P.2d 1059, 253 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988).
189. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
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Congress intended for ERISA to provide exclusive remedies for actions
arising under employee benefit plans. 190 A contrary rule would under-
mine Congress' policy of promoting uniform laws governing benefit plans
by creating the potential for conflicting standards of recovery.' 9' In ER-
ISA itself, however, Congress reaffirmed its long-standing policy of defer-
ring to state regulation of insurance companies. Thus, in determining
whether section 790.03(h) is preempted under ERISA, courts are faced
unavoidably with conflicting congressional policies.
The Pilot Life Court exacerbated this conflict by relying on Con-
gress' intention that ERISA remedies be exclusive without counterbal-
ancing Congress' clear intention in ERISA that state laws regulating
insurance should be exempt from preemption. 192 Since Pilot Life did not
need to resolve this conflict in deciding the issue before the Court, the
decision provided no guidance for reconciling these competing policies.
The Roberson and Goodrich courts reflect differing judicial ap-
proaches to this problem. The Roberson court interpreted Pilot Life
broadly but ERISA's preemption provisions narrowly. 93 In so doing,
the court ignored the plain meaning of the saving clause and other im-
portant federal laws. The Goodrich resolution of this issue is superior for
a number of reasons.
First, the Goodrich court's application of the two-part saving clause
analysis to section 790.03(h) is more reasonable than the Roberson
court's. Section 790.03(h) is directed specifically at the insurance indus-
try under a "common sense" understanding of the phrase.' 94 Moreover,
contrary to the Roberson court's conclusion, it has an integral effect on
the insurer-insured relationship. 95 This conclusion is supported by the
profound regulatory effect of section 790.03(h) on the conduct of insurers
in dealing with their insureds.' 96 Moreover, the Roberson court's spe-
cious claim that section 790.03(h) is not a content regulation, and thus
not integral to the insurance contract, 197 was refuted persuasively by the
Goodrich court's recognition that the laws of the state, including section
790.03(h), are incorporated into every insurance policy. 98 Thus, under
the test developed by Metropolitan Life and applied by Pilot Life itself,
section 790.03(h) is a law regulating insurance within the meaning of the
saving clause.
190. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
191. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
195. Goodrich v. General Telephone Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 675, 688, 241 Cal. Rptr. 640,
647 (1987).
196. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
197. Roberson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 661 F. Supp. 416, 422 (1987).
198. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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This finding, however, does not completely resolve the issue. Fol-
lowing the lead set by Pilot Life, the Roberson court concluded that a
state law that provides remedies to employee plan participants is pre-
empted, despite being within the saving clause. 199 This conclusion is
flawed because it fails to acknowledge ERISA's express prohibition
against impairing or invalidating state laws that regulate insurance.
In contrast with the Roberson court's single-minded analysis, "the
Goodrich approach balances competing federal concerns with fidelity to
both. ' 20 0 The Goodrich decision recognizes that Congress intended ER-
ISA remedies to be exclusively within the scope of ERISA preemption.201
The scope of ERISA preemption is established clearly in the saving
clause. Thus, the Goodrich decision absorbs both competing policies in a
manner consistent with the structure of ERISA itself.
This more internally consistent interpretation also better serves pub-
lic policy. Little is accomplished, in terms of the purposes behind ER-
ISA, by preempting bad faith actions arising under ERISA regulated
plans. Permitting policyholders to maintain actions against plan insurers
will not disrupt the uniform administration of employee benefit plans by
employers.20 2 Preventing policyholders access to state laws of bad faith,
however, severely damages the state's ability to regulate insurer miscon-
duct. Thus, a weighing of public policy concerns also favors the Good-
rich court's resolution of the issue.
Conclusion
In retrospect, the most striking aspect of the major cases considering
this issue is the way in which the courts have employed questionable
judicial reasoning to achieve socially undesirable results. Any one of
these cases, taken individually, can be supported on the ground that
other laws adequately protect the interests of employee plan participants.
When considered together, however, these cases combine to create an
unacceptable situation for all but the insurance industry.
The vast number of Californians who obtain insurance through em-
ployee benefit plans should not be denied the rights and protections bad
faith law provides. There are neither powerful policy reasons, nor over-
whelming legal arguments that compel this inequitable conclusion.
In fact, through application of a more coherent framework of analy-
sis and recognition of the manner in which the issues involved relate to
each other and to important federal and state laws, the law of bad faith
can be restored to its rightful place as an important check.
199. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
200. See Note, supra note 83, at 1395.
201. Goodrich, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 686-87, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
202. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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